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I. INTRODUCTION
When Professor Andy Siegel o f  Seattle University School o f  Law
invited participants to take part in  this symposium, he challenged us to
think broadly about the proper role of the courts in the American system
of constitutional government. A s  is characteristic o f  Professor Siegel,
the challenge was a significant one. Indeed, when these papers were first
presented i n  an  earlier f o rm a t  the 2008 Annual Meeting o f  the
Southeastern Association o f  L a w Schools, h e  gently chided the
participants that, perhaps, we had not thought broadly enough about his
challenge!
I have taken those comments to  heart in  revising my thoughts.
However, I  ultimately concluded that the best way to "think big" about
the role o f  courts was to start on a small scale and build up. Acco rd -
ingly, this Essay suggests that the broader role o f  courts in  the United
States can be at least marginally better understood through a relatively
simple analogy: the recently popularized conception o f  judges as um-
pires.
During the hearings on his nomination to become Chief Justice o f
the United States, John Roberts stated:
Judges and justices are servants o f  the law, not the other way
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules,
they apply them. Th e  role o f  the umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everyone plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.'
t Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; J.D. 1992 Columbia University Law School;
B.A. 1989 University of Rochester. This Essay grew Out of a presentation at the 2008 Annual Meet-
ing of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools. I  thank the panelists at that presentation for
their insights. I  also wish to thank Professor Andrew Siegel of Seattle University School of Law for
organizing this symposium and inviting me to participate with such a distinguished group of panel-
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Roberts' umpire anal() d r e w  attention in the media at the time of the
confirmation hearing.
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tary, most of which has been highly critical of the comparison:
4
ists. The staff of the Seattle University Law Review has also done an incredible job working on this
Essay as well as the symposium in general. I  am grateful for  their efforts. I  am also indebted to
Debbie Allen for  her excellent substantive comments on this Essay as well as Jason Steams for
enduring many discussions about my ideas (as well as his comments, which were quite helpful in
shaping my thoughts). Final ly, thank you to my sons, Ben and Noah, for  their incessant talk of
baseball in the summer of 2008, which made writing this particular Essay the only realistic way 1
could get any work done while in their presence.
I. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter
"Roberts's Conf Hearing"]; see also id. at 56 ( "I will remember that it's my job to call balls and
strikes, and not pitch or bat.").
2. Of course, John Roberts was not the first person to compare the roles of judges and umpires.
Other such references have appeared i n speeches by  prominent American legal luminaries,
court decisions at both the state and federal level, and academic commentary. See, e.g., Young v.
Corrigan, 208 F. 431,437 (N.D. Ohio 1912) (Mi l le judge must cease to be merely an umpire at the
game of litigation."); State v. Crittenden, 38 La. Ann. 448, 451 (1886) (a judge does not "sit[] mere-
ly as an umpire to decide disputes which may arise between [counsel]"); Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) (discussing the neutral role of
the trial judge in American adversarial litigation); Justice Robert H. Jackson, Address at the Bar
Association's Annual Dinner at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, Why Learned and Augustus Hand
Became Great (Dec. 13, 1951), available at http://www.roberthjacksomorg/documents/1213511
("And the test of an independent judiciary is a simple one—the one you would apply in choosing an
umpire for a baseball game. What do you ask of him? You do not ask that he shall never make a
mistake or always agree with you, or always support the home team. You want an umpire who calls
them as he sees them.").
3. See, e.g., Mike Conklin, Make the Call: Are Judges Umps?, CHI. TRIEL, Sept. 16, 2005, at 1;
Susan N. Herman, Roberts' Pitch More Like a Curve Ball, NEWSDAY, Sept. 16, 2005, at A57.
4. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1019, 1035 (2006) (generally criticizing the analogy); Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's
Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069
(2006) ("At his confirmation hearings for the Chief Justice position, Judge John Roberts began the
proceedings by analogizing his future role to that of a baseball umpire. Although both make deci-
sions, it is hard to think of a less apt analogy."); Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 23, 46-47 (2007) (noting that the analogy has some appealing elements but concluding
that it ultimately "breaks down"); Susan N. Herman, Balancing the Five Hundred Hats: On Being a
Legal Educator/Scholar/Activist, 41 TULSA L. REV. 637, 640-46 (2006) (criticizing the analogy for
failing to take into account the inherent biases of judges); Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires,
35 HOESTRA L. REY. 1709, 1723 (2007) (supporting some elements of the analogy but concluding
that "the umpire metaphor has dumbed down the public's appreciation of the constitutional role of
judges."); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.O. L. REV.
1049, 1051 (2006) ("The formalist conception of judging crudely depicted by Roberts is fancied up
in versions intended for academic audiences. N o serious person thinks that the rules that judges in
our system apply, particularly appellate judges and most particularly the Justices of  the U.S.
Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires."); L.A. Powe,
Jr., Judges Struck by Lightning: Some Observations on the Politics o f  Recent Supreme Court
Appointments, 39 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 875, 882 (2007) (describing the analogy as "absurd[]"); Caprice L.
Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifidng the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV.
567, 617-19 (2007) (criticizing the analogy and referring to it as a "pontificationn"); Neil S. Siegel,
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 701-02 (2007)
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This Essay provides at least a limited defense of some parts of the
umpire analogy and ultimately suggests that this analogy may tell us
something important about the more general role of courts in the United
States. Before embarking on this limited defense, it is important to high-
light a preliminary point: by their very nature, all analogies are of limited
utility. An analogy compares things that are by definition different from
one another.
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and an orange. That analogy can tell one something, perhaps even some-
thing important, about the two items. For  instance, it may make clear
that both items grow on trees or that both are fruits. However, what the
analogy does not do is make an apple into an orange or vice versa. A t
the end of the day, the apple remains an apple and the orange remains




















































judge. Perhaps it explains a great deal. But, and this is a critical but, the
analogy does not mean that a judge is an umpire. Jus t as the apple
remains an apple, the judge remains a judge.
True to the fact that analogies compare dissimilar things, it  goes
without saying that there are critical differences between umpires
and judges! For  example, an umpire's decision is a one-shot endeavor
with limited, i f  any, effect on later plays. Calling a runner out at first
base during the first inning tells one nothing about whether a runner will
be out at first base in the fifth inning. O f  course, judicial decisions
do have an effect in later cases. Judges also generally explain their deci-
sions while umpires rarely do. A n  umpire's decision is generally not
(arguing that recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning race-conscious student
assignment "vividly illustrate how inapt the umpire analogy is i f  one takes its appeal to formalism
seriously as a statement about how judges can or should execute their responsibilities in constitu-
ional cases."); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of  Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155,166 (2006)
(noting that "there is something to the umpire analogy—although not as much as [Chief] Justice
Roberts's testimony suggests.").
5. For example, the first definition of  "analogy" in a widely available dictionary is "Corre-
spondence in some respects between otherwise dissimilar things." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 40 (1999).
6. The dangers of analogical reasoning were not lost on either the Chief Justice or some of his
questioners. See, e.g., Roberts's Conf Hearing, supra note 1, at 266 (statement of  Sen. John
Comyn) ("As a good lawyer, you know the danger of analogies, and yesterday we started talking
about judges and umpires."); id. at 267 (statement of John Roberts) ("Well, I think I agree with your
point about the dangers of analogies in some situations.").
7. Others have noted various differences between umpires and judges when discussing the
Chief Justice's confirmation hearing analogy, some of  which I  discuss in the text. See, e.g.,
Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 47-48; N. Siegel, supra note 4, at 710 n.34; Solum, supra note 4, at 166
n.28.
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subject to appellate review as judicial decisions are! Moreover, umpires
do not possess the life tenure held by federal judges under Article III of
the Constitution.
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susceptible to outside influences than are judges. And, of course, judges
operate in  a political environment far different from that in  which
an umpire makes his or her decisions. Thus, politics (or perhaps more
accurately political ideology) matters to a judge—to one degree or an-
other—in a way it does not for an umpire.
However, just because there are significant differences between
umpires and judges does not mean that the analogy should be rejected
out-of-hand. To begin with, the fact that there are differences allows one
to use an analogy in the first place. I f  there were no differences between
the two actors, an analogy would not be necessary; the judge and the
umpire would be the same. Moreover, these differences are important
because they may inform how useful the analogy may be in determining
the role of the courts. I  return to that question later in this Essay.
rn T h epoint now is that the mere fact that differences exist between umpires
and judges, even important ones, does not require rejection o f  the
analogy.
With these critical preliminary points out of the way, we can move
to the limited defense of the umpire analogy. This  Essay proceeds in
four parts. Part II explores in more depth what those making the umpire
analogy appear to mean. A t  its heart, the analogy principally has been
used to address the substantive decision making of judges. This Part will
explain that there is more to the analogy than such a narrow decisional
focus suggests. Par t  I I I  builds on Part II. I t  explains non-decision
making similarities between umpires and judges. This Part suggests that
the analogy is  more complex than is  apparent i f  one only views i t
through the lens o f  decision making. I t  also explores how these
non-decisional similarities can be useful in understanding the role of the
judiciary in our constitutional system.
8. Although infrequent in practice, an umpire's decisions may be reviewed in some situations.
A prominent example is the famous "pine tar" call in a game between the New York Yankees and
the Kansas City Royals in 1983 Kansas City Royals All-Star third baseman George Brett was
called out after hitting what appeared to be a home run when the umpires concluded that Brett's bat
had too much pine tar applied to the handle. T hat  call was overturned by American League
management officials and the game was resumed at a later date. For  a description of this famous
baseball incident, see MLB.com BASEBALL'S BEST: THE PINE TAR GAME (1983), available
at http://m1b.mlb.cornimlbibaseballs_bestimlb_bb_gamepage.jsp?story_page=bb_83reg_072483_kc
rnyy.
9. See U.S. GONST. art. 111, § I
10. See infra Part V.
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Part IV of the Essay turns to the analogy as applied to decision
making specifically. I t  is here that the debate has raged. Part IV argues
that the analogy provides some important insight into the decisional
role of judges. Part V returns to the broader theme of this symposium. I t
explains how the umpire analogy informs a consideration of the appro-
priate role of a judge in American constitutional democracy. I t  acknowl-
edges the dangers inherent in the use o f  this particular analogy, but
ultimately concludes that the risks are worth taking.
IL THE UMPIRE ANALOGY IN OPERATION
We can only speculate about what Roberts meant to illustrate by
comparing judges with baseball umpires. I t  might have been a statement
of philosophy cast i n  workaday terms," a  shrewd political tactic
designed to advance the prospects of his confirmation,
12 o r  e v e n  a  b i t  
o f
hum r." Perhaps it was some of all of these things.
Regardless of what Chief Justice Roberts meant, it is important to
consider how the analogy has been perceived or used by others. I t  seems
clear that, with one significant exception, the analogy has been used
largely to compare the "decisional" roles of the judge and the umpire;
14
I I .  See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 24 ("Both Roberts' emphasis on judicial modesty and
the likening of judges to baseball umpires are brilliant ways to characterize judging in almost
entirely non-controversial but nevertheless significant ways. Roberts appreciated, I am sure, that in
making these statements he was tapping into many if  not most Americans' attitudes about judges—
they want their judges to follow the law, wherever it takes them, and not to legislate from the bench
or substitute their personal preferences for those embodied in the law.").
12. Some commentators have mused about this possibility. See, e.g., C. Roberts, supra note 4,
at 616-17 (discussing the analogy in the context of  a performance quite accurately described as
"politically smooth"); N. Siegel, supra note 4, at 711 n.38 (commenting that Judge Roberts "may
have been politicking by telling Senators and the public what he thought they wanted to hear").
13. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1051 (referring to the umpire analogy and writing that he
assumed its use was "tongue-in-cheek").
14. The principal exception to the decisional focus of the use of the umpire analogy concerns
the point that both umpires and judges are expected to be neutral. Thi s  aspect of  judging was
discussed at the Chief Justice's confirmation hearings. See, e.g., Roberts 's Conf. Hearing, supra
note 1, at 8 (statement of  Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("Judges must be impartial and independent");
Statement of Senator Jeff Sessions, id. at 31 (noting that "the legal system demands a  fair and
unbiased umpire . " ) ;  id. at 56 (statement of John Roberts) ("If I am confirmed, I will confront
every case with an open mind."). The analogy's implications for this aspect of judging have also
been noted in academic commentary. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi 8c G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges
According to Citation Bias (As a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOIRE DAME L. REV. 1279, 1279
(2007) (noting that "[m]ost view the ideal judge as a neutral and unbiased decision maker" and
opining that the Chief Justice "invoke[ed] this ideal in his confirmation hearings by using the umpire
analogy"); N. Siegel, supra note 4, at 704 (recognizing that the umpire analogy captures the notion
that judges should not base their decisions on, among other things, "personal policy preferences").
Three decades before John Roberts's use of the analogy, United States District Court Judge Marvin
Frankel made a similar point when comparing judges and umpires. See Frankel, supra note 2, at
1035 ("Whether or not the judge generally achieves or maintains neutrality, it is his assigned task to
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in other words, the debate principally has been centered on how these
actors should make decisions as a substantive matter. In  brief, the argu-
ment goes that judges, like umpires, should enforce rules, not make
them.
The decisional focus of the analogy was on display rather clearly at
the Chief Justice's confirmation hearings. For example, when favorably
discussing the umpire analogy, Senator J eff Sessions noted that
"the people rightly demand judges who follow, not make the laW."
15And other Senators echoed Senator Sessions's sentiments, whether
focused on the umpire analogy itself
16 o r  m o r e  
g e n e r a l l y  
o n  
t h e  
r o l e  
o f
judges under the Constitution." Roberts also picked up on this deci-
sional theme, commenting that "judges operate as judges when they are
confined by the law."
18 The analogy has also been discussed in decisional terms in much of
the academic commentary. F o r  example, Duke University School of
Law Professor Neil Siegel has powerfully critiqued the analogy as short-
hand for representing an "across the board l i m i t e d  judicial role in
vindicating constitutional r ights."
I9 S i m i l a r l y ,  
J u d g e  
W i l l i a m  
P r y o r  
o f
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit praised the
analogy precisely because he viewed it as an indication of modesty in
judicial decision making.
2°
be nonpartisan and to promote through trial an objective search for the truth."). I  discuss this
non-decisional aspect of the analogy in more detail below. See infra Part 1II.B. As  I explain, the
neutrality point is correct, but it is also incomplete as most frequently employed.
15. Roberts's Conf Hearing, supra note 1, at 31(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
16. See, e.g., id. at 46 (statement of  Sen. Sam Brownback) (discussing the analogy with
approval and noting that "we need a more modest Court—a Court that is a court, and not a super-
legislature. That looks to the Constitution as it is, not as we wish it might be, but as it is, so that we
can be a rule-of-law nation.").
17. See, e.g., i d at 2 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (noting that confirming John Roberts
"would present a very unique opportunity for a new Chief Justice to rebuild the image of the Court
away from what many believe it has become, a super-legislature " ) ;  id. at 8 (Statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch) ( "I applaud President Bush for resisting this trend [of using politics as a guide for
judicial nominations] and for nominating qualified men and women who as judges will not legislate
from the bench . " ) ;  i d at 24 (statement of  Sen. Mike DeWine) ("Judges need to restrict
themselves to the proper resolution of the case before them. They need to avoid the temptation to set
broad policy."); id. at 35 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (praising President Bush for nominat-
ing "strict constructionist[s]” as federal judges); id. at  49 (statement o f  Sen. Tom Coburn)
("Essentially, the Court will not become an activist court i f it adheres to its appropriate role and does
not attempt to legislate or create policy.").
18. Id. at 177 (statement of John Roberts).
19. N. Siegel, supra note 4, at 706.
20. See William H. Pryor, Jr., The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty,
60 FLA. L. REV. 1007,1009,1013-14 (2008); see also Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 37-38 (discussing
the analogy in context of judicial modesty, although ultimately rejecting the comparison).
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It is  understandable that the discussion has been centered on
decisional matters. The core function of both a judge and an umpire is
to make decisions. A  pitch is a ball or a strike; a government action is
constitutional or  unconstitutional. I t  is  precisely because decisional
matters are critical to both umpires and judges that it is so tempting to
limit analysis of an analogy between these two actors to this one albeit
critical—aspect of their roles.
However, in addition to assessing the decision making aspect of the
analogy, it  is important to consider whether there are other bases of
comparison that can tell us something useful about the role of the judge.
Accordingly, I  consider first what might be drawn from the umpire
analogy with respect to non-decisional matters. O n ly  then does this
Essay discuss whether the analogy tells us anything meaningful about the
content o f  decision making itself, which is  a far more difficult and
controversial question.
NON-DECISIONAL ASPECTS OF THE UMPIRE ANALOGY
Leaving aside comparisons concerning the content o f  decision
making, there are several respects in which the role of umpires in base-
ball can be used to understand the role of judges in the American system
of government. This Part first discusses four such bases of comparisons
highlighting the similarities between judges and umpires. I t  then
discusses what these similarities tell us about the role of the judiciary.
Importantly, these non-decisional aspects of the analogy have received
almost no attention in the debate.
A. Both Umpires and Judges are Part of the "Game"
21One similarity between judges and umpires is that both actors are a
part of the "game" in which they are empowered to make decisions.
22 A tone level, this point is glaringly obvious. A  professional baseball game
is not official without an umpire just as a formal trial cannot take place
without a judge. But there is more to this basis of comparison than this
simplistic explanation suggests.
21. My reference to a "game" is in no way meant to trivialize the importance of litigation,
constitutional or  otherwise. I  use the term merely for dramatic effect. O f  course, i t is precisely
because litigation is not a game that makes an analogy in this context inherently dangerous.
22. One of the constitutional scholars 1 most admire, Professor Michael Gerhardt, mistakenly
rejects the umpire analogy in part "because umpires are not part of  the actual game of  baseball
whereas judges and Justices are a part of the system of checks and balances set forth in the Constitu-
tion." Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 47. As  described in this sub-part, umpires are, in fact, a critical
part of what we call the game of baseball.
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In baseball, the umpire is not merely required to be present for a
game to be official. The umpire is, in fact, a part of the field of play just
as are the players. For  example, if  a baseball touches an umpire in fair
territory before it touches an infielder, the ball is a fair ball and runners
may advance.
23 
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to be ignored. He or she is an integral part of the game itself.
24 This aspect o f  the umpire's position in  baseball is  useful in
describing a part of the judge's role. The judicial branch of government
under the Constitution is not a mere observer. Instead, it is a co-equal
branch in the tripartite national government under the Constitution.
25After all, the Framers created a  system o f  government with three
branches, not two and "something extra." And, of course, we can find
many writings contemporaneous with the Constitution's ratification to
support the basic notion that the judiciary was meant to be an integral
part of the American constitutional order.
26 It is true that recognizing that both umpires and judges are part of
their respective "games" tells  one nothing about how they each
make substantive decisions. But  this reality does not indicate that this
similarity means nothing. Instead, it  illustrates a fundamental point
about analogies themselves. T hey  may be useful to describe some
aspects of similarity between dissimilar things even if they do not answer
all possible questions. Thus, one should take this point of comparison on
its own terms for what it describes about the role of a judge vis-a-vis the
role of an umpire. They each play a role in their respective games in part
because they are a part of those games.
B. Both Umpires and Judges are Neutral, but Neither is Disinterested
A second important similarity between an umpire and a judge is
that both are expected to be neutral. I n  the judicial context, the neutral
23. See Official Major League Baseball (MLB) Rule 5.09(0 (describing effect of a fair ball
touching an umpire before i t touches or  passes an infielder other than the pitcher); see also id.
6.08(d) (noting in part that "NJ' a fair ball touches an umpire after having passed a fielder other than
the pitcher, or having touched a fielder, including the pitcher, the ball is in play."). The MLB rules
can be found at http://m1b.mlb.comimlb/official_infoiofficial_rulestforewordjsp.
24. Other rules make this point as well. See, e.g., id. 5.08 ( " If . . a  pitched or thrown ball
touches an umpire, the ball is alive and in play."); id. 5.09(b) (describing effect of plate umpire's
interference with a catcher's throw); id. 5.09(g) (describing effect of  a ball being lodged in the
umpire's mask or other equipment).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I (describing the Legislative Power); art. II (describing the Executive
Power); art. III (describing the Judicial Power).
26. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Casey & James
McClellan eds., 2001); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12
S. Cr. ECON. REV. 115 (2004) (collecting sources concerning views of judicial power contempora-
neous with the ratification of the Constitution).
2009] A  Limited Defense 5 3 3
judge is a basic prerequisite of due process.
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When we say that an umpire is neutral or impartial, we mean that
he or she does not have a bias concerning the outcome of a given play or
game. The umpire should not care whether the runner is out or safe at
first base or whether the Boston Red Sox or Tampa Bay Rays win the
game. This, of course, is the same neutrality we demand of a judge. He
or she should not care i f  the plaintiff or defendant wins a motion or a
trial. A n d  it  is this similarity in the neutral positions of  judges and
umpires that has been cited as important by  others relying on the
analogy.
29 Neutrality as described above provides only  limited utility  in
constructing the proper role of a judge. This "do not fix the game" type
of neutrality is simply so obvious that an analogy really is not necessary.
Once one moves beyond this form of  impartiality, I  agree with other
commentators that the analogy breaks down because judges will never be
able to prevent their life experiences or even overall judicial philosophies
from influencing their decisions.
3° T h i s  d o e s  
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consciously biased. Rather, i t  indicates that there are influences in
judging that effect outcomes beyond the nature of the "play." Similar
influences tend to be absent from umpiring.
27. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ( "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in a trial of
cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.").
28. See MLB Rule 9 official cmt. (specifically reminding umpires of  their obligation to be
"impartial").
29. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2 (noting that as with a judge one does not want an umpire
who will "always support the home team. You want an umpire who calls them as he sees them");
Ilya Somin, Judge Jerry E. Smith and the Origins o f  the Judge-Umpire Analogy, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, Aug. 2, 2008, http://volokh.com/postsil217669631.shtml (quoting Fifth Circuit Judge
Jerry E. Smith as saying that "A judge should not consider his or her personal preferences as to
outcome, any more than an umpire should call balls and strikes based on which team is his or her
favorite."); see also sources cited in note 14, supra.
30. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 14, at 1280 ("The problem with the vision of the judge
as baseball umpire is apparent i f one talks to a skilled litigator. The litigator will tell you that a key
element of preparing a case is figuring Out a judge's biases and playing to them"); McKee, supra
note 4, at 1712 ("The umpire metaphor obscures the reality of personal bias. Getting beyond that
bias is extremely difficult even for the most introspective and sincere judge. I  submit that we will
never get beyond i t i f we do not allow for the certainty that each of us harbors some bias in some
degree, and that our bias may be impacting a given decision in ways in which we are simply not
aware."). O f  course, an umpire's life experiences matter too because all human behavior is affected
by who we are, where we have been, and what we have done. Yet, the umpire's experience does not
seem to compare qualitatively to a judge's judicial philosophy.
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Thus, comparing the sole element of neutrality has limited ( if any)
utility in our quest to better convey the role of the judiciary through the
judges-as-umpires analogy. Stopping the analysis there, however, leads
many in this debate to miss an important and related point of compari-
son: investment. For  although an umpire is a neutral actor in his or her
game, he or she still has an interest in ensuring that the game proceeds in
accordance with the mles.
31 T h e  
s a m e  
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f o r  
a  
j u d g
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she should not care which litigant prevails, the judge has a vested interest
in ensuring that the applicable rules are followed.
32 A  j u d g e  i s  
n o t
indifferent to maintaining constitutional government. This  conclusion
does not tell one anything about the content of decision making, but it
need not do so to be helpful for purposes unrelated to the substantive
content of decisions.
C. Both Umpires and Judges Rely on Adversary
Contests to Trigger Their Power
Umpires have tremendous power in  the context o f  a baseball
game.33 O ne obvious and critically important aspect of this power is
determining whether base runners are out or safe.
34 B u t  t h a t  
p o w e r  l i e s
fallow until there is n actual play between the opposing teams. Just
imagine if  th re is no base runner and, before the pitcher even throws the
ball, the second base umpire calls the batter out in a play at second base.
That call is  inappropriate not because the second base umpire lacks
power in the abstract, but rather because the adversary contest that is a
necessary precondition to the exercise of that power is absent.
There are strong similarities between this power-triggering aspect
of an umpire's authority and that of  a judge. A  judge's authority is
contingent on an actual adversary contest. Constitutional doctrines pro-
hibiting advisory opinions
35 a n d  
r e q u i r i n g  
t h a t  
l i t i g a n
t s  
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e  
s t a n d
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3 6
areconcrete implementations of this principle. Indeed, the Chief Justice
31. See, e.g., MLB Rule 9.01(a) (directing that the umpire is to ensure that the game is played
"in accordance with these official rules.....32. TheCifJustc,nonfirmation hearings, recognized this as a valid basis of compari-
son between umpires and judges. See Robert's Conf. Hearing, supra note 1, at 55.
33. See, e.g., MLB Rule 9.01 (generally outlining the broad authority of umpires in a baseball
game); Id 9.01(a)(I) (directing that the umpire-in-chief "take full charge of, and be responsible for,
the proper conduct of the game").
34. See, e.g., Id 9.04(b)(1) (empowering umpires to make "all decisions on the bases except
those specifically reserved to the umpire-in-chief").
35. For a general discussion of  advisory opinions in federal court, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 53
-
60  ( 3 d  e d .  2 0 0 6 ) .
36. For a general discussion of standing doctrine in federal court, see id. at 60-102.
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recognized the importance of such matters at his confirmation hearings
even if he did not expressly tie them to umpiring.
37
D. The Importance of Position for Both Umpires and Judges
Perhaps the most significant non-decisional similarity between
umpires and judges is  the importance o f  position as related to their
substantive decisions. Specifically, the state of the rest of the "game," in
particular the positions of the other participants, provides the necessary
context for  the judgments o f  those charged with decision making
authority.
Baseball provides a good example. I n  scenario number one,
assume there are no base runners when the batter steps into the batter's
box. Given this setting, you will see that the second base umpire posi-
tions himself or herself in the shallow outfield. Why? Given the state of
the game, the umpire is more likely to make a call in the outfield (e.g.,
determining whether a ball is caught or trapped) than anywhere else on
the field of play.
38 
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two. Here, assume that in addition to the batter there is a runner on first
base. I n  this scenario, the second base umpire positions himself or her-
self in the infield. The reason, of course, is that given the situation—
critically, the physical position o f  the players—the umpire's eyes are
most needed for a play at second base.
39 The point one can draw from these two baseball scenarios is not
related (at least directly) to the substantive content of decision making.
After all, an out is an out. Rather, they illustrate something useful about
the context in which the decision is made. Other actors' positions make
an important difference in the setting in which the umpire's decision is to
be made.
This same basic insight is consistent with the application of judicial
power. A  judge employs his or her power differently depending on the
narrowly defined context of the case, as well as the broader context in
which the case is presented. Perhaps most obviously in the narrow sense,
the decisions that are made are dictated by the parties and their litigation
claims and defenses. Mor e  significantly, however, is  the impact o f
37. See Roberts's Con! Hearing, supra note 1, at 161 (statement of John Roberts) ("So the
obligation to decide cases is the only basis for the authority to interpret the Constitution and laws.
That means that judges should be careful in making sure that they have a real case in front of them, a
real live dispute between parties who have actual injury involved, actual interests at stake, because
that is the basis for their legitimacy.").
38. See MANUAL FOR THE F OU R
-
M AN  U M P I R E  
S Y S T E M  
i ,  
a v a i l a b l
e  
a t  
h t t p : / /
w w w . l i t t l e
l e a g u e .
org/Assets/forms_pubsilimpires/FourMantimpireSystem.pdf.
39. Id. at I-2.
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position in the broader sense. I n  other words, the political context in
which a case is presented matters a great deal.
Some concrete examples make the point. One can begin with a fa-
mous, or perhaps infamous, relatively recent Supreme Court decision:
Bush v. Gore.
4s3 
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after the 2000 presidential election.
4
' I  w i l l  n o t  
a r g u e  
h e r e  
i n  
f a v o r  
o f  
o r
against the controversial decision on the merits halting the recount.
Rather, the point I wish to make is that the political context in which the
case arose—the position o f  the players i f  you will—almost certainly
made a difference both in terms of the Court's decision to hear the case
42as well as the nature of the decision itself. A t  least as far as the Court
appeared to be concerned, the political actors in our system were not
capable o f  resolving the dispute—at least not in a sufficiently timely
marmer. T he  Court felt compelled to act given that context but also
appeared concerned about the broader effects its decision might have.
So, for  example, the per  curiam opinion's attempt t o  l imit  the
precedential impact of the decision was a result of the position in which
the Court found itself.
43 O n e  
c a n  
f a u l t  
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while acknowledging the contextual reality that pushed the Court to at
least attempt to limit the broader impact of its holding.
Another illustration o f  positional importance concerns cases
in which courts are confronted with separation of  powers questions.
Specifically, when the Supreme Court is called upon to resolve a power-
oriented dispute between the coordinate political branches, the position
of the other players (here, the other branches) makes a  world o f
difference. There is much that could be said about how a court should
approach this issue substantively. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that,
in such situations, the courts should structure their decisions so as to
most likely advance certain foundational constitutional values.
44 M y
40. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
41. Id at 100-03. The Supreme Court ultimately halted the recount based on equal protection
principles. I d  at 110.
42. One senses the weight of the moment in both the per curiam opinion and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence. See i d at 111 ("None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial
authority than are the members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitu-
tion's design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legislatures, and to
the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes
our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has
been forced to confront.") (per curiam opinion); id. at 112 ("We deal here not with an ordinary
election, but with an election for the President of the United States.") (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring).
43. Id at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.").
44. See Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of
Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 881-90 (2007).
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limited point here goes instead to a non-decisional component of  the
matter. When a court faces serious separation of powers questions, the
relative positions of the competing branches should inform the approach
the court takes in the case. Thus, for example, i f  the political branches
are controlled by  different parties, a court's approach might be less
"intrusive" than if  there is unified political contro1.
45 T h e  r e a s o n  i s  
t h a t
competing political partie  might be seen as proxies to protect the institu-
tional prerogatives of the branches of government.
Yet another possibility in which the political situation matters is
where the legal or popular cultural landscape is such that the political
actors are effectively incapable of acting. I n  such a situation, the posi-
tion of  other players in the system might suggest a more aggressive
judicial role than situations in which the centers of political authority are
oriented so that they are realistically capable of addressing the matter.
An excellent illustration of  such a situation is the actions o f  federal
courts, particularly in the South, in the context of the civil rights move-
ment.'" A s  John Roberts noted at his confirmation hearings when
discussing with approval the Supreme Court's landmark decision Brown
v. Board o f  Education,
47 " t h e  
o t h e r  
b r a n c h
e s  
a n d  
s o c i
e t y  
w e
r e  
n o
t
addressing the problems of segregation in the schools. They  were not
just slow to act. They weren't acting."
48 I n  s u m ,  
t h e  
p o s i t i o n s  
i n  
w h i c h
45. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REv. 2331,2335-72 (2006) (arguing that the theory of separation of powers should be
viewed differently depending on whether the political branches are controlled by the same political
party).
46. A prime example of this point can be found in decisions in the area of the country covered
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit during the 1950s and 1960s. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of  Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding orders
concerning faculty desegregation); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (ED. La. 1963)
(three-judge district court struck down Louisiana's use of certain voting tests on equal protection
grounds); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (three-judge district court struck
down Montgomery, Alabama ordinance requiring segregation of city buses). For  a relatively recent
biography of  one o f  these path-breaking southern federal judges, see Jack Bass, TAMING THE
STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER
CIVIL RIGHTS (Doubleday 1993). One could also cite some of the Supreme Court's decisions early
in the so-called "war on terror" to illustrate the point. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (striking down military commission system at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as inconsistent with
the Uniform Code of Military Justice); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that 28 U.S.C. §
2241 provided federal courts with jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions filed by detainees
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Some would say that the political branches were not sufficiently willing
to confront the separation of powers issues implicated by the indefinite detention of enemy combat-
ants. See generally Allen, supra note 44, at 881-90 (discussing the role of courts in this context).
47.347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. Roberts's Conf Hearing, supra note 1, at 178. The Chief Justice went on to note that the
courts could not appropriately have reached out to address the situation without an actual case or
controversy. See id. ("But that didn't mean courts should step in and act. But when the courts were
presented with a case that presented the challenge, this segregation violates the Equal Protection
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the political actors found themselves provided the context—indeed,











































within which umpires make their calls. This is the case even though the
positions o f  the other relevant actors do not dictate the substantive
content of the decisions to be made.
5°
E. What the Non-Decisional Similarities Between
Umpires and Judges Tell Us
In and of themselves, the four non-decisional similarities between
umpires and judges discussed above are not necessarily monumental.
Collectively, however, they provide important context for considering
the broader questions posed by this symposium concerning the proper
role of the judiciary in American constitutional government.
In the aggregate, the non-decisional similarities remind us that
judges are an integral part of the whole that is democracy in the United
States. T h e  "game" o f  American government, as the Constitution
constructs it, would not be the same i f  the judiciary were eliminated.
Judges are a part of the process as much as the political players. And
while judges must be neutral if  they are to play their pivotal role in the
system as a whole, they cannot be seen as disinterested in the process
itself. They have institutional values at stake, much as the political par-
ticipants do.
Extending the analysis, i t  is  also clear that the comparison to
umpires illustrates that the considerable power judges hold is  not
properly viewed in the abstract. Rather, that power, both in terms of its
ability to be used as well as the manner in which it is exercised, depends
on the other players in the system. As  to the ability to exercise judicial
power, the necessity for an adversarial contest is an essential part of the
overall process by which governmental power is balanced among differ-
ent political centers o f  authority. J us t as baseball would be almost
unrecognizable if  umpires could wield their unquestioned authority with-
out an actual play, American government would simply not be the same
Clause, the courts did have an obligation to decide the case and resolve it, and in the course of doing
that, of course, change the course of American history."). This point goes to the requirement for an
adversarial contest to trigger a court's authority, which I have discussed above. See supra Part 1II.C.
49. Professor Siegel makes a similar point when discussing Brown. See N. Siegel, supra note
4, at 706 ("Whether a case calls for restraint or decisive action or something in between seems less a
theoretical question and more a matter of tact, context, and judgment.").
50. Professor Solum has made a similar point in discussing the roles of judges. See Solum,
supra note 4, at 171 ("The application of rules to particular facts may require sensitivity to context
and purpose, but that does not mean that there are no rules or that rules do not have constraining
force.").
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without the limiting effect of requiring that an adversarial contest trigger
judicial authority.
Perhaps most importantly is  that the manner in which judicial
power is exercised is dependent on the state of the game, including the
positions of the other actors in the system. This aspect of a judge's role
is just as important as requiring that some adversarial contest exist before
a judge can use his or her power. Indeed, it may be more important be-
cause it is more subtle. The neutral judge, who is part of the game and
has h is  o r  her  power triggered, may  apply  that power quite
differently depending on the situation. Thus , the same exercise o f
authority may be considered more or less legitimate depending on the
situation in which it is brought to bear.
IV. DECISIONAL ASPECTS OF THE UMPIRE ANALOGY
The judges-as-umpires analogy is not usually invoked to debate the
non-decisional similarities between judges and umpires. Without ques-
tion, the far  more common use o f  the analogy is  to discuss the
substantive content of decision making. I n  other words, as described
above, the analogy is deployed most frequently to describe how judges
should make decisions.
51 Decisional comparisons between judges and umpires are powerful.
When a judge acts, he or she almost by definition makes a decision.
I f  an analogy accurately describes how those decisions are made, the
analogy is highly significant. I t  is likely precisely because of the power
of the analogy that it is so controversial. This part of the Essay suggests
that there are similarities between the decisional roles of  judges and
umpires that could assist one in articulating the appropriate role of the
judiciary in American government.
A. The Umpire and Decisional Authority
Let us begin by considering the umpire. An  umpire is constrained
by the rules o f  baseball; he or  she is  required to enforce those pre-
existing rules.
52 
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on his or her personal view of  what the "correct" rule should be; an
51. See supra Part
52. See MLB Rule 9.01(b) ("Each umpire is the representative of the league and of profes-
sional baseball, and is authorized and required to enforce all of [the MLB] rules. . " ) ;  see also id.
9.05 official cmt. ("Do not allow criticism to keep you from studying Out bad situations that may
lead to protested games. Carry your rule book. I t  is better to consult the rules and hold up the game
ten minutes to decide a knotty problem than to have a game thrown out on protest and replayed.")
(emphasis added).
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umpire simply cannot say that a player has walked with only three balls
pitched outside the strike zone instead of four.
53 But saying that the umpire is limited by the rules of the game is
only the beginning of a description of his or her authority. A t  times, the
rules themselves provide the umpire with explicit authority to make
judgment calls.
54 A n d  





















to the umpire, there is no doubt that he or she is called upon—indeed,
xpected to—make myriad judgment calls during the course of a game.
The rules define what is a strike
55 a n d  w h a t  
i s  a  
b a l k ,
5 6  
f o r  
e x a m p l
e ,  
b u t
the implementation of these rules necessarily requires judgment.
Despite the detailed nature of  baseball's official rules, there are
situ tions in which the rules will not address a given situation that may
occur in a game. When that occurs, what is an umpire to do? He or she
cannot wait for a rule to be drafted which will then be enforceable. A
call must be made and the umpire must make it. Take for example a
situation posited in a blog-posting by Professor Howard Wasserman.
57Assume that a batter hits a long fly ball into the deep outfield. T he
centerfielder almost catches the ball, but it pops out of his glove. I f  the
ball lands on the field it would be in play.
58 I f  t h e  b a l l  
m a k e s  
i t  
i n t o  
t h e
53. See id 2.00 (defining "base on balls" to be "an award of first base [which is] granted to a
batter who, during his time at bat, receives four pitches outside the strike zone"); Id 6.08(a) (provid-
ing that "a batter becomes a runner and is entitled to first base" when "[flour 'balls' have been called
by the umpire").
54. See, e.g., id. 6.06(d) (providing that a batter is out i f "[h]e uses or attempts to use a bat that,
in the umpire's judgment, has been altered or tampered with in such a way to improve the distance
factor or cause an unusual reaction on the baseball"); id. 7.06(b) (providing that an umpire "in his
judgment" may impose penalties "to nullify [an] act of obstruction"); id. 7.09(1) (providing that it is
interference " If, in the judgment of  the umpire, a base runner willfully and deliberately interferes
with a batted ball or a fielder in the act of fielding a batted ball with the obvious intent to break up a
double play ...." ) ; id. 7.09(h) (providing that it is interference i f "In the judgment of the umpire, the
base coach at third base, or first base, by touching or holding the runner, physically assists him in
returning to or leaving third base or first base) ; id. 8.02(d) (providing certain penalties should the
umpire "in his judgment" determine that a pitcher intentionally pitched a ball at a batter); id 9.01(e)
(providing the umpire with discretion to eject players and other participants or spectators from the
game).
55. See id 2.00 (defining the strike zone as "that area over home plate the upper limit of which
is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants,
and the lower level is a line at the hallow beneath the kneecap").
56. See id 8.05 (defining 13 situations each of which constitutes a balk by the pitcher). M LB
Rule 7.04(a) provides that when there is a balk each runner other than the batter may advance one
base.
57. The situation discussed i n the text is based on Professor Wasserman's posting on
Prawfsblawg in the summer of 2008. See Posting of Howard Wasserman to PRAWFSBLAWG,
Umpires, Judges, and Interpretation, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/07/umpires-
and-jud.html (July 8, 2008 07:45 EST).
58. See MLB Rule 2.00 (defining a "fair ball" to include a batted ball that "while on or  over
fair territory touches the person of an umpire or a player").
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stands after hitting the player's glove and without touching the ground it
would be a home mn.
59 B u t  
w h a t  
i f  
t h e  
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lands on the outfield wall, neither on the field nor in the stands? The
rules of baseball do not address that situation, but an umpire would be
required to rule on the matter.
In the situation posited above, the absence of a specific rule on the
situation does not mean that an umpire is  free to start from first
principles and make a ruling based on his or her personal views of how
baseball should be played. This is so even though the official rules of the
game expressly provide that "[e]ach umpire has authority to rule on any
point not specifically covered in these rules."
6° I n s t e a d ,  h e  
o r  s h e  
m u s t
make a decision that is informed by the pre-existing rules, even if  those
rules do not addres  the specific matter at hand. In other words, the deci-
sion will not be dictated by the rules in the same way as the size of the
strike zone (which is specified in the rules), but it will be influenced by
the extant rules.
In the end, what we see by considering an umpire's decisional
uthority is that rules matter because they frame the game. When rules
are clear, the umpire enforces them. A t  times, the rules themselves
provide authority to the umpire to make a judgment call while at others
such authority is implicit in the nature of the question (e.g., whether a
pitch is a ball or strike).
61 A n d  
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the rules do not provide an answer. Yet, even here the existing rules are
a pow rful influence on an umpire because they provide the broader
context within which the specific decision is to be made. I f  that decision
is fundamentally inconsistent with baseball, the game has been changed.
Essentially, we trust the umpire to make a judgment consistent with the
59. See id 6.09(h) (providing that i f  a fielder deflects a fly ball "into the stands or over the
fence in fair territory, the batter shall be entitled to a home run").
60. Id 9.01(c).
61. Discussion of the strike zone appears to be a common means of engaging with the umpire
analogy. W hat one notices in these discussions is that there is often a misconceived notion that
having discretion about whether a pitch is a ball or  a strike means that the rule defining the strike
zone has no constraining effect on the umpire. See, e.g., Roberts 's Conf. Hearing, supra note 1, at
203 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) ("No two umpires h a v e  the same strike zone a n d  ballplay-
ers under s t and that, depending upon who the umpire is t h e  game can be called entirely
differently."); McKee, supra note 4, at 1724 ("I think it fair to say that the umpire metaphor would
be more accurate if, rather than proclaiming that we merely call balls and strikes like an umpire, we
recognize that the strike zone is actually defined by the umpire who is calling the balls and strikes.").
Now-Vice President Biden came closest to accurately placing the strike zone in context when he
served in the Senate during the Chief Justice's confirmation hearings. H e indicated that umpires
don't get to change the pre-existing strike zone and therefore would not be able "to say that was
down around the ankles, you know, and I think it was a strike. They don't get to do that." Roberts 's
Con! Hearing, supra note 1, at 185 (statement of  Sen. Joe Biden). There is discretion, but i t is
constrained.
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nature of the game itself. After  all, as outlined above, umpires may be
neutral but they are not disinterested.
62
B. The Judge and Decisional Authority
The similarities between the decisional authority of an umpire and a
judge are remarkable in many respects, at least when viewed at a certain
level of abstraction. Just like an umpire, a judge is constrained by rules,
whether they are based in the common law, statutes and associated
regulations, or the Constitution. This does not mean that one must be a
rigid formalist in terms of judicial philosophy.
63 W h e r e  a  
r u l e  
p r o v i d e s  
a
clear answ r to a question presented, we expect that a judge will apply
the pre-existing rule. F o r  example, the Constitution mandates that a
person must have "attained to the Age of thirty five years" in order to be
eligible to serve as President.
64 A s s u m i n g  
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e  
c o n t r o v
e r s y  
a r o
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concerning this constitutional rule, we would expect a judge to apply it
s written and not "interpret" the provision in a manner at odds with the
straightforward meaning of the document.
Of course, anyone who has gone to law school (or probably even
read about judicial decisions in a newspaper) understands that the over-
whelming majority of questions judges address are not as clear-cut as the
one concerning a thirty-year-old person's eligibility to serve as President
of the United States. Some of these less clear-cut situations are akin to
those in  baseball i n  which the umpire is  given express o r  has
implicit discretion to exercise judgment.
65 T h e  m o r e  
i n t e r e s t i n g  
c o m -
parison, owever, concerns the judicial equivalent of the ball coming to
rest on the outfield fence. How does a judge's role compare to that of an
umpire in a situation that is not covered by the applicable rule, whether it
is based in the common law, statutes, or constitutions?
62. See supra Part II1.13.
63. Much of the academic commentary has discussed the analogy as it relates to formalism in
legal reasoning. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 1051; C. Roberts, supra note 4, at 618; N. Siegel,
supra note 4, at 701-02; Solum, supra note 4, at 165-66. This is not surprising given the manner in
which the analogy was discussed at the Chief Justice's confirmation hearings. See supra Part II. As
this Part of  the Essay explains, however, the analogy need not be restricted to pure formalist
reasoning.
64. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5.
65. For example, there are legal rules that provide express discretion to judges. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (providing explicit discretion to circuit courts of appeals to permit certain
interlocutory appeals). There are also rules in which the exercise of judicial discretion is necessarily
implicit. Many of the Federal Rules of Evidence operate on this principle. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
402 (authorizing admissions of  relevant evidence as defined by Rule 401); id. 403 (authorizing
exclusion of  relevant evidence on grounds such as prejudice and confusion). Judge Posner has
written about a concept similar to such implied discretion in which judges make decisions in a "zone
of reasonableness." See Posner, supra note 4, at 1065-66.
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A judge does essentially what an umpire does when confronted
with a situation not contemplated by the relevant set o f  rules. B y
necessity, the way in which a judge approaches such a situation will vary
depending on the source of the rule relevant to the given situation. But
what is common to the judge's approach is that, like an umpire, his or her
decision is not based on personal preferences. Instead, the judge seeks to
ground his or her ruling within the broader structure of the "game"—
American democracy. For example, it is a common principle that when
faced with an open question in the context of a statute, the judge will rule
in such a way that advances the intent of the legislature that enacted the
law at issue.
66 The situation may appear to be more complicated when the
issue concerns constitutional interpretation. Whether it is in fact more
complicated might be debated. What is not debatable is that the need to
make decisions not dictated by the language of the governing rule arises
with great frequency when dealing with the Constitution and its highly
open-textured provisions.
° A t  i t s  
h e a r t ,  
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this situation in the same general manner as does the umpire when
confronted with a matter not addressed in the rules: he or she bases deci-
sions on the nature of the American democratic structure.
The similarities between umpires and judges in  approaching
questions left open by pre-existing rules are clear. There is no question
that saying a judge should use the structure of American democracy as a
constitutional guide leaves many specifics unaddressed. F or  example,
was the Supreme Court majority in Boumediene v. Bush
68 c o r r e c t  t h a t  t h eConstitution's Suspension Cl use
69 a p p l i e s  i n  
t h e  
c o n t e x t  
o f  
n o n -
c i t i z e n s
detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, even though the historical record did
not show that the writ o f  habeas corpus had been available to such
persons in the past?
7° O r ,  
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h a n















his dissent that the absence of historical support for the extension of the




66. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 61 (2008) (discussing legislative intent as stated
key to interpreting statutes).
67. One need only consult the constitutional text itself to recognize that many questions are not
addressed by the words of the document alone. For example, what is an "unreasonable search," U.S.
CONST. amend. IV, or a "cruel and unusual punishment," U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, to cite just two
constitutional provisions?
68.128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
69. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.").
70. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248-51.
71. Id at 2297.
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The fact is that the umpire analogy does not answer the question of
whether the Boumediene majority's approach was correct or whether
Justice Scalia should have carried the day. Bu t  this acknowledgment
does not undermine the utility of the analogy, for criticism of the analogy
on this ground conflates different questions. The first, and the one for
which the analogy is potentially useful, concerns the general rubric that
should be used to "fi ll in gaps" in pre-existing rules. The judge (and
umpire) should use the larger structure of the game, be it democracy or
baseball, as a guide. The second question, the one the analogy does not
reach, concerns the interpretative tool or tools the judge (and umpire) is
to use to determine what is consistent with that larger structure.
The analogy need not answer every question to be successful. I t  is
useful because it tells us something about how the judge should orient his
or her thinking. I t  is true that saying that a ruling should take into
account the nature of the game leaves questions unanswered. Bu t  this
simply means that the analogy is not all-encompassing. When we say
that an umpire should make decisions with an eye toward the nature of
baseball, we do not say anything about how he or she should make
that determination. Whether the umpire considers the views of Abner
Doubleday or other early fathers of the game
72 a s  c o n t r o l l i n g  
o r  
i n s t e a d
considers how the game has developed over time is the next level of the
analysis. T h e  same is  true in constitutional interpretation when one
considers whether the views of the Framers are dispositive or whether
the changing nature of  American culture makes any difference at all.
The fact is that one can accept the analogy's applicability to the first
generic question without fear that i t  falls apart because it  does not
address, for example, whether original public meaning is the guiding
principle of constitutional interpretation.
73
72. Abner Doubleday is popularly credited with inventing baseball, but in fact Alexander Jay
Cartwright appears to be responsible for what we understand the game to be today. See, e.g., Sean
Ullman, A  B r i e f  History o f  Baseball.' Par t  I :  Or igins o f  the Game, avai lable a t
http://www.baseballl.comfbb-dataie-hist-thtml (discussing early history of  modern baseball); see
also JULES TYGIEL, PAST TIME: BASEBALL AS HISTORY 3-14 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
73. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court described the original public meaning approach to
constitutional interpretation as focused on what the ratifiers of a particular constitutional provision
would have understood the words of the document to mean. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008) ("In interpreting this [Constitutional] text, we are guided by the principle that
Vi l e Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.' Normal meaning may of course
include an idiomatic meaning, but i t excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been
known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.") (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716, 731 (1931) (other citations omitted)). Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Heller was consistent
with his earlier work advocating an original public meaning approach to constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A  MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1998). A  significant competing view can be seen in Justice Stephen Breyer's articulation of a more
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V. THE UMPIRE ANALOGY IN CONTEXT:
A TENTATIVE, CAUTIOUS CONCLUSION
Let us return to where we began: What should be the role of the
judiciary in American democracy today? This fundamental question has
generated wide-ranging discussion almost since the Constitution was
ratified. Perhaps there is no single theory that can adequately capture the
role of the judge in democratic government. Yet, it is possible, I think, to
suggest some broad parameters within which a judge should perform his
or her function. The umpire analogy can assist us in that endeavor.
As explained above, the analogy can be used to explain both
decisional and non-decisional aspects of the judiciary's role.
74 F u n d a -mentally, the an logy underscores four important points about the role of
judges: First, judges are as much a part of our system of government as
are the more explicitly political actors. Their power is triggered only in
limited circumstances—when there is an adversarial contest b u t  when
such a  situation is  presented, judges are not mere appendages or
bystanders. Second, the way in which judges should approach a given
problem should vary depending on the particular positions of the other
actors in American democracy, including the other coordinate branches
of the federal government, the States, and the People. Third, judges must
be neutral, but we should not expect them to be disinterested. T o  the
contrary, we should expect them to have a vested interest in preserving
our system o f  constitutional government. A n d  finally , where
pre-existing rules do not provide a clear answer, judges should be guided
by the overall structure of the system in which they operate.
It may be true that one need not use an analogy to establish these
principles concerning the proper role of the judiciary. But that criticism
can be made with respect to all analogies; they are never necessary to
make a point. Rather, analogies are useful because they help translate a
concept that may be difficult to grasp into a conceptual framework that is
more accessible. Many  Americans—perhaps most Americans—do not
confront the profound issues o f  the judiciary's role in  democratic
government on a regular basis. Invoking baseball, often referred to as
America's favorite pastime:
75 m i g h t  b e  
a  w a y  
t o  
s e n d  
a  
m e s s
a g e  




that ore people will understand. After all, baseball is a part of popular
flexible form of  constitutional interpretation taking into account a number of variables. STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (Vintage 2005).
74. See supra Parts
75. See TYGIEL, supra note 72.
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culture in many respects, including pop-art,
76 m u s i c ,
7 7  a n d  
p o e t r y ,
7 8  t o
name b t a few avenues of expression.
9 I n d e e d ,  a s  
t h e n - S e n a t o r  
B i d e n
recognized, John Roberts's use of  the analogy at his confirmation
hearings most certainly played to this populist theme."
I fully recognize that there are dangers associated with comparing
judges to umpires. As  Professor Gerhardt colorfully put it: "How could
anyone disagree with [John Roberts] and not sound like a nut?"
8I S i n c eat some level analogies can only have meaning in the eye of the be-
holder, there will be a risk that comparing umpires and judges could lead
to a minimization of the judiciary's role. I t  could be that the analogy is
taken (or employed) to demean the institution instead of proclaiming its
important role in government. However, the need to explain why judges
are important in our system of government is critical enough (at least for
me) to take the risks associated with using the analogy. The Essay ex-
plains how this can be done and, in this way, contributes something to a
broader theory of the role of the judiciary.
In the end, it seems that we are still engaged in the same basic
enterprise with which John Marshall and the other members of the Court
were concerned over two hundred years ago when they struggled to
define the role of the Article III judiciary under the newly ratified Consti-
tution. I t  is as true today as it was in 1803 that it is "emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
82But this statement is only the beginning, as it was in many respects for
the Marshall Court. I t  is merely a piece of the much larger puzzle that is
American constitutional government. Perhaps we w i l l  always be
working on that puzzle. I t  is a worthwhile endeavor so that we can live
up to President Abraham Lincoln's exhortation on the battlefield at
76. A famous example is the Norman Rockwell print showing three umpires standing as the
rain begin begins to fal l . Nor m an Rockwell, Bottom o f  the Sixth, available at http://www.
rockwellprints.com/printsibottomsixth.htm.
77. See, e.g., JOHN FOGERTY, Centerfield, on CENTERFIELD (Warner Bros. 1985).
78. See, e.g., ERNEST LAWRENCE THAYER, CASEY AT THE BAT (AC. McClurg & Co., Caslon
Press 1912) (1888).
79. The American obsession with baseball is also evidenced by Justice Harry Blackmun's
famous—or infamous—ode to the great players of the game in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,260-64
(1972). Some of the internal anxiety at the Supreme Court concerning Justice Blackmun's decision
to write about the game itself in this antitrust case is described in a book detailing life at the Court in
t he ea r l y  1970s .  S e e  B O B  W O O DW ARD &  SCOTT ARMSTRONG,  T HE  BRET HREN:  I NSI DE T HE
SUPREME COURT 223-26 (Simon & Schuster 1979).
80. See Roberts's Conf Hearing, supra note 1, at 185 (statement of Sen. Joe Biden) (describ-
ing popular reaction to the umpire analogy). The same point was also made by Senator Lindsey
Graham. See id. at 256 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (describing the analogy to baseball as
one that "Ialverage people could understand.").
81. Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 24.
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,177 (1803).
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Gettysburg that "government of the people, by the people, for the people,
shall not perish from the earth."
83
83. President Abraham Lincoln, Address at Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Penn.:
Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at http://www.bartleby.com/43/36.html.
